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Abstract 
Our study examines whether patent applications with international collaborations are more 
likely to be awarded a US patent than applications without. It contributes significantly to the 
growing literature that examines from the innovator’s viewpoint the likelihood of securing the 
patent grant.The analysis focuses on the full sample (almost half a million) of patent 
applications over the period 2001-2009 at the USPTO, that disclosed at least one EU located 
inventor, and furthermore, explicitly distinguishes between countries with high and low number 
of patent applications. Firstly, we find that applications from teams rather than individual 
inventors are more successful in obtaining a patent grant, and that results are even better for 
international teams. Our key finding is that the presence of a US entity, either as inventor or 
owner, plays an important role in securing the grant. For low innovative countries, other types 
of international collaborations also matter significantly pointing to the benefits for these 
countries to become more extrovert. We further find that a large part of the US ‘effect’ can be 
attributed to additional prosecution efforts, as it is evident by continuing patent applications.  
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1. Introduction 
There has been an ever increasing interest, both academic- and policy-wise, on the 
process of obtaining a patent. There are strong reasons that place this process at the 
heart of innovation policy and therefore we are in need of better understanding on its 
mechanisms and implications.  
First, organizations and inventors alike file more patent applications in recent 
years compared to the past, since they perceive this type of Intellectual Property as one 
of the main legal documents protecting and/or appropriating their inventions. In 1995 
global patent applications marginally exceeded 1 million, while in 2015 this figure has 
risen to almost 2.9 million (source: WIPO).1 
Second, patents have been shown to be related closely with a number of 
economy-wide variables. Since the study of Griliches (1981) scholars have shown that 
patents positively contribute to firm’s market value (see for instance Tseng et al. 2005, 
Blundell et al. 1999, Sandner and Block 2011).  Further, patents have been linked to 
the successful acquisition of venture capital by startups (Mann and Sager 2007), 
increased sales (Balasubramanian and Sivadasan 2011), increased exports   (Chalioti et 
al. 2016) and potentially strengthen future M&As (Breitzman et al. 2002). Moreover, 
the studies by Lerner (2009) and Moser (2005) provide some evidence that patents and 
patent laws may spur innovation. 
The literature on the process of obtaining a patent, commonly referred to as 
patent prosecution, examines characteristics and behavior of the two parties involved: 
i) the patent office, representing the central planner, and ii) the innovators. While  in 
the literature there has been significant progress in understanding the incentives and 
organization of the patent office,2 these is considerably less research work from the side 
of the innovators. In this paper, our focus is on the latter.  
Our main objective is to examine whether international inventors’ 
collaborations in a patent application are more likely to result in a patent than no such 
collaborations. In doing so, we also explicitly consider the owner’s location and 
strategic activities to secure the patent grant. Our focus is on the 28 EU member 
countries and we distinguish between countries with high and low innovative activity 
as evident by patent applications. 
 
1
 These numbers were extracted from the WIPO Statistics Data Center:  
 https://www3.wipo.int/ipstats/index.htm  
2
 See for instance Frakes and Wasserman (2016), Lemley and Sampat (2012) and Schuett (2013). 
3 
 
 We draw information primarily from the PatEx dataset maintained by the Office 
of the Chief Economist at the USPTO. The PatEx dataset has detailed information for 
all patent applications that are published at the USPTO. We obtain information on 
virtually all patent applications filed between 2001 and 2009 that disclose at least one 
EU located inventor. We then provide several hypotheses that predict the likelihood of 
patent grant based on the existence and types of inventor collaborations. 
When we examine the population of patent applications with EU located 
inventors, we find that applications stemming from teams, rather than individual 
inventors, are more likely to be issued a patent. This result is robust across all 
specifications and sample definitions. Next, we find that patent applications by 
international teams are more likely to be issued a patent.  
Further, the overall presence of a US co-inventor or co-owner increases the 
likelihood of obtaining a grant; however, this result is heterogeneous between high and 
low innovative EU countries. These results however change qualitatively when we 
focus on patent applications that are less likely to be products of strategic or persistent 
patent prosecution; i.e. patent applications not associated with continuing patent 
applications. In particular, for such applications the presence of a US entity may still 
deliver a higher likelihood of patent grant; however, in most cases this effect diminishes 
pointing to the important role of strategic prosecution of obtaining a patent.  
An important finding that emerges is that for less innovative countries, non-
EU/non-US collaborations also deliver higher likelihood of patent grant. These overall 
findings indicate that for these countries international collaborations are beneficial in 
pursuing the right patentable inventions and further securing the patent grant pointing 
to the need for these countries to become more extrovert.  
In a recent important study to the patent prosecution literature, Webster et al. 
(2014) examine the role of international collaborations in securing the patent grant. Our 
contributions to this study and the associated growing literature are the following: i) in 
addition to examining international inventor collaborations, we also examine the role 
of ownership, ii) we examine the role of strategic patent prosecution, as evident by the 
presence of continuing applications, in a joint framework with international 
collaborations. 
A potential critique for this paper is that it focuses on US patent outcomes rather 
than EPO patent outcomes. Indeed, between the two big offices, EPO is the closest 
patent office for EU countries than the USPTO. While the EPO grants patents with 
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higher standards (de Rassenfosse et al. 2016), the nature of the EPO system makes 
patent prosecution less appealing. Most importantly, for an EPO granted application to 
be active in all EU countries, the applicant needs to translate and validate to each 
country individually. The total cost can reach up to 30,000 Euros (Berger 2005; 
European Commission  2011), a cost so high which results in low validation rates for 
the majority of EU countries (Harhoff et al. 2009; Danguy and de la Potterie 2011). 
The above costs are one of the main reasons that have driven EU located entities to 
pursue patenting at the USPTO at higher rates than in the EPO. Indeed, according to 
both Offices’ data3,4, during 2007-2014 EU countries filed for 518,649 EPO 
applications and 588,534 USPTO applications.5 
The next section discusses the importance of patent prosecution for innovation 
and frames the hypotheses. Next, we describe the econometric strategy followed by the 
data construction section and discussion of summary statistics. The results section 
discusses the findings and finally the paper concludes. 
  
2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Framing 
2.1.Importance of Patent Prosecution 
Many Northern EU countries experience a high GDP per capita and low 
unemployment rates while most of the EU South faces a number of challenges (Ezcurra 
and Pascual 2008). Further, and perhaps more importantly, convergence between these 
regions is still elusive and faced with many challenges (Kaitila 2004; Geppert and 
Stephan 2008). Both policy makers and scholars have identified that innovation activity 
is the engine of growth and a key in achieving a larger degree of economic coherence 
across countries (Jones 2005). Patents play an important role in this process as ideally 
they can provide incentives to innovate (Scothmer 2004).6 
However, the innovator faces an uphill battle when it comes to granting her 
patent. In fact, only two in every three applications are issued a patent (see relevant data 
in Section 4). 
 
3
 https://www.epo.org/about-us/annual-reports-statistics/statistics.html  
4
 https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/appl_yr.htm  
5
 The high costs of patent prosecution for an EPO patent to be validated across all EU countries is one of 
the main reasons, EU will launch the Unitary Patent (see Economics 2014). 
6
 There is a large debate on whether patents in their current form and institutional context can provide 
incentives to innovate or rather hinder innovation. While there are arguments or empirical observations 
in favor of the above statement (Lerner 2009, Moser 2005) and against (Bessen 2008, Heller and 
Eisenberg 2008, Murray and Stern 2008) this discussion is beyond the scope of the paper. 
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However, for the innovator to devote time and money to a risky project, she 
needs to have an understanding on how to protect her invention. In countries where 
knowledge about the patent system is limited, the incentives to perform innovation 
activity are further diminished. To make matters worse, patent prosecution is costly and 
further associated with many hidden costs.  
 
2.2.Framing the Hypotheses 
Given the challenges and importance of securing the grant and clearing 
uncertainty of property rights, it is important to examine whether inventor composition 
plays a role. First and foremost, we should point to the need for teamwork. Singh and 
Fleming (2010) and Schettino et al. (2008) examine whether teams are associated with 
patents of higher quality. They find that teams deliver on average more important 
patents; further, breakthrough innovations are more likely to stem from teamwork. 7 To 
the extent that higher quality inventions are associated with higher propensity of patent 
grant (Lei and Wright 2017), then the above findings could lead to the first testable 
Hypothesis8: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Teams should be associated with increased likelihood of patent grant 
 
Scholars have recently examined from the innovators’ viewpoint the factors that can 
influence the likelihood of patent grant. In an early and most related, to ours, literatures, 
scholars have examined the likelihood of grant by inventor’s origin country.9 Webster 
et al. (2014) examined whether, for a sample of approximately fifty thousand patent 
applications, patent grant outcomes in EPO and Japanese Patent Office (JPO) differ by 
inventor’s home country. The authors found a strong positive home bias effect in both 
 
7
 Agiakloglou et al. (2016) have shown that patents by team of inventors are also more likely to be 
commercialized. 
8
 We do not follow a strict definition of Hypothesis statement. We merely aim to describe what are the 
predictions of this discussion for the likelihood of patent grant. 
9
 A parallel literature to the following is the one that examines whether different patent offices across the 
world have different patentability standards. Webster et al. (2007) examined whether patent likelihood 
varied between EPO and JPO across a series of covariates. De Rassenfosse et al. (2016) examined patent 
grant outcomes in the five largest offices, including USPTO, with their main focus being on the standards 
of granting a patent. Sampat and Shandlen (2017) also examine secondary pharmaceutical patenting 
outcomes across patent offices. They find that procedural aspects play a key role in grant outcomes. 
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offices.  In other words, a patent application with Japanese inventor (European 
inventor) will be associated with a higher probability of patent grant in the JPO (EPO).10  
In this paper, in addition to examining inventors we also consider applicants. In 
a patent application, there are two types of entities; the inventors and the owners. The 
inventors are persons that have invented the invention embedded in the patent 
application while the owner is the person, or legal entity, that owns the patent 
application. For instance, a patent application could disclose several inventors that are 
employed by a firm which is in turn is the application’s owner.  
The above study points to a testable hypothesis, tailor-made, for the USPTO: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The presence of a US inventor or applicant, in the patent application, 
will increase the likelihood of grant 
 
It is also important to consider the innovative capabilities of each country. 
Highly innovative countries, while may benefit from the above collaborations they are 
also likely to be knowledgeable of the patent system and have the resources to pursue 
a sound patent application. On the other hand, low innovative countries are less likely 
to have the knowledge or the resources. Therefore, they may indeed benefit more by 
the aforementioned collaborations. This leads to the fourth testable hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Patent applications from low innovative countries will benefit more, in 
terms of securing the patent grant, from all types of collaborations.  
 
In a parallel literature, scholars have also examined whether different 
prosecution activities/strategies by patent applicants can increase the likelihood of 
patent grant. For instance, Henkel and Jell (2010) discuss the factors that may influence 
deferred examination in Germany while Yamauchi and Nagaoka (2015) studied this 
type of examination in Japan. Deferred patent examination takes place when the 
applicant requests from the patent office not to proceed to the review of the patent 
application for some time (usually months or few years). This action is not applicable 
to the US case as the USPTO does not allow for this action by applicants. 
 
10
 In a recent study De Rassenfosse et al. (2017) examine standard-essential patent applications at the 
Chinese patent office and find that applications that are known to be essential to a standard by a foreign 
firm are likely to be treated unfavorably while similar patent applications by Chinese firms are not. 
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Van Zeebroeck et al. (2009) show that patent applicants have increased the size 
of their patent applications making it harder and more time-consuming for examiners 
to review applications. This could be a strategy, at least for some applicants, to wear 
down the examiner and secure the grant (Lei and Wright 2017). De Rassenfosse et al. 
(2018) also show that the quality of the patent attorney hired by the applicant to draft 
the application and interact with the patent office increases the likelihood of the patent 
grant.  
 The above discussion shows that increased prosecution efforts by applicants can 
alter the outcome of patent grant. In the US, a major way for an applicant to increase 
the likelihood of patent grant is via the use of continuing applications. In the US, 
applicants have the option of filing patent applications claiming priority of a parent 
application; these latter applications are called continuing applications and are of three 
types: Continuations, Continuations-in-part and Divisionals. One of the main reasons, 
applicants opt for continuing applications is to secure patent grant of a variation of the 
original invention (for a more detailed discussion see Quillen and Webster 2001 and 
Quillen et al. 2002). Therefore, for this paper we should expect that the use of 
continuations will increase the likelihood of patent grant and further could dilute the 
role of co-inventorship or co-ownership: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Continuing patent applications will be more likely to secure the grant. 
In addition, the may dilute the role of collaborations.  
 
 
3. Econometric Setup 
The above hypotheses point to the importance of the existence and types of 
collaborations for the likelihood of patent grant. In particular, to test Hypotheses 1 and 
2, the first series of regressions will be of the following form or similar versions thereof: 
 
,,	,
 =  + ,,	,
 + ,,	,
 + ,,	,

+ ,,	,
 + + ,,	,
 + !",,	,
 + 
                               $ + %	 + &
 + ',,	,
       (1) 
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 Starting with the subscripts, i denotes the ith patent application; u denotes the 
first three-digit US patent classification that the ith patent application is assigned to; c 
denotes the country, or countries, that the inventors of the ith patent application are 
located; y is the application year of the ith patent application. 
 Team takes the value of 1 if the patent application has more than one inventor 
and 0 otherwise. International takes the value of 1 if the patent application has more 
than one inventor and at least two inventors are located in different countries and 0 
otherwise.  
USCoinventor takes the value of 1 if the patent application has at least one US 
located inventor and 0 otherwise. Similarly, USOwner takes the value of 1 if the patent 
application has a US located owner and 0 otherwise. We should highlight that a US 
owner is not uncommon; 15.3% of the patent applications in the sample, which have 
owner information, are owned by a US entity. Further, in the entire sample 8.7% of the 
patent applications disclose a US co-inventor. Finally, while there is significant overlap 
between the USCoinventor and USOwner dummies, there is still significant variation. 
63.8% of the applications that disclose a US owner do not disclose a US co-inventor. 
At this point, we should stress that via our data compilation process, we did not 
obtain owner information for 21% of the sample. We can reasonably assume that these 
are applications which are inventor owned. To control for this group of applications, 
we therefore include a dummy denoted as InventorOwned which takes the value of 1 if 
patent application lacks owner information and 0 otherwise.  By including the USOwner 
and InventorOwned dummies, we compare the likelihood of grant between these 
applications and applications that are owned by a non-US entity.11 
 PCT takes the value of 1 if the patent application has followed the PCT route. 
Applicants that belong in countries that have ratified the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(PCT) can file for a patent application at the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO).12 While WIPO does not have examination authority, the applicant can use 
WIPO to file to the jurisdictions she wishes via this latter office. This process gives the 
applicant more time to decide to which countries to protect her invention and therefore 
also delay paying application fees.  
 
11
 As we include these two dummies, the comparable group is all other applications owned by a non-US 
firm or organization. 
12
 Currently 152 countries have ratified the PCT. 
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 $is a set of 463 dummies that capture the first three-digit US technology 
classification the patent application is assigned to. This technology classification is 
assigned by the USPTO once it receives the patent application13. For a more detailed 
discussion see Lerner (1994). %	 is a set of 28 dummies that capture the location of the 
EU inventor(s). &
is a set of 9 dummies that capture the application year of the patent 
application. 
 Finally, we should note that for approximately 84% we have information on the 
number of claims filed. Therefore, for this subset of inventions we also add the number 
of claims (Claims) and the claims squared. The claims in a patent denote the scope of 
application the embedded invention can be used for.  An applicant generally wishes to 
be issued a patent with many claims as this will provide her with broader monopoly 
rights (Kuhn and Thompson 2017); in that case such a patent application could be 
viewed with caution by the patent office. On the other hand a patent with many claims 
could be a, rather noisy, indication of a high quality patent (Bessen 2008). Therefore, 
how more claims in the application will affect the probability of grant remains an 
empirical question which we will examine in the following Section. 
In the second set of models, we are further interested in the composition of the 
international collaborations. Therefore, for this part of the analysis we examine 
applications that disclose at least two inventors. More importantly, to test Hypothesis 
3, we will examine separately patent applications that disclose an inventor from a low 
innovative country and from a high innovative EU country. To this end, we classify EU 
countries in two groups. The first, TOP10EU, are the countries with the highest number 
of patent applications at the USPTO, and in our sample are associated with at least 
10,000 patent applications each.14 These TOP10EU countries are AT, BE, DE, DK, FI, 
FR, UK, IT, NL and SE. 
Inventors from these TOP10EU are likely to have access to more resources with 
respect to patent prosecution and more knowledge of the inner workings. The second, 
LOW18EU, are countries with lower patenting activity. These two groups of countries 
are distinctively different when it comes to patenting propensity as Hypothesis 3 hints. 
TOP10EU countries account for 95% of EU patenting, whereas LOW18EU for the rest.  
 
13
 https://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspcindex/indextouspc.htm  
14
 For a time series see: https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/appl_yr.htm  
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Starting with patent applications that disclose at least one inventor from a 
TOP10EU country, we estimate regressions of the following form: 
 
,,	,
 = ( + ()ℎ"10-,,	,
 + ("10-_/)-18,,	,
 +
(,,	,
 + (1-1,,	,
 + ",,	,
 + $ +
%	 + &
 + ',,	,
         (2) 
 
  WithinTOP10EU takes the value of 1 if at least two inventors are from different 
countries and all inventors are located in TOP10EU countries and 0 otherwise. 
TOP10EU_LOW18EU takes the value of 1 if at least one inventor is from a LOW18EU 
country. NonEUNonUSCoinventor takes the value if at least one inventor is located 
outside the EU and US and 0 otherwise. The way the above regression is specified 
compares the WithinTOP10EU, TOP10EU_LOW18EU, USCoinventor and 
NonEUNonUSCoinventor dummies with within same country collaborations from 
TOP10EU countries.  
 When we consider patent applications that disclose at least one inventor from a 
LOW18EU country, equation (2) changes slightly to: 
 
,,	,
 = ( + ()ℎ/)18-,,	,
 + ("10-_/)-18,,	,
 +
(,,	,
 + (1-1,,	,
 + ",,	,
 + $ +
%	 + &
 + ',,	,
         (3) 
 
In essence, we replace the WithinTOP10EU with the WithinLOW18EU dummy 
which takes the value of 1 if at least two inventors are from different countries and all 
inventors are located in LOW18EU countries. Finally, in later regressions, we also 
include USOwner and InventorOwned dummies both to equations (2) and (3). 
Finally, to test Hypothesis 4, we compare patent applications that are associated 
with continuing applications and the rest, denoted as stand-alone applications. We 
perform either separate estimations or include them together and examine any 
statistically significant different effect between the two groups in terms of team 
composition. 
Note that we employ Ordinary Least Squares to estimate the above econometric 
model. While the dependent variable is a dummy and a probit or logit model could be 
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used, the large number of fixed effects makes such estimators less precise (Angrist and 
Pischke, 2008). Several studies have opted for the linear probability model when they 
encompass a large number of fixed effects (see for instance Belenzon and Schankerman 
2013). I any event, for our baseline estimations, we present results from probit 
estimations to provide robustness. 
 
4. Data Construction and Description 
4.1. Data Construction 
Our primary source of data is the Office of the Chief Economist at the USPTO 
and in particular the PatEx database which describes in detail the prosecution history 
of all patent applications that opted for publication after November 20, 2000 (Graham 
et al. 2015).15,16 We extracted detailed information for 475,857 patent applications filed 
between 2001 and 2009 that disclose at least one inventor from one of the 28 EU 
countries. Given that the dataset runs through 2015, our decision to stop at 2009 is to 
credibly identify patent applications that have been abandoned and have not been issued 
a patent and most likely will not be issued a patent in the future.17 
 A major contribution of this study is that we complement this dataset with 
information regarding the patent owner. This piece of information is important as we 
can examine whether the inventor collaboration findings are confounded by patent 
ownership. However, patent applications do not disclose the patent owner, as in the US 
only a person can file for a patent application. Therefore, only the inventors are 
disclosed at the patent application.  
 To extract information on patent ownership we rely again on the USPTO Office 
of the Chief Economist and the patent assignment dataset (Marco et al. 2015).18 In the 
US, once patents are transferred between entities, the transaction is disclosed at the 
USPTO.19 For the purpose of our study, we are interested on the first transaction of 
 
15
 https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/electronic-data-products/patent-examination-research-
dataset-public-pair 
16
 Before that date, patent applications in the US were not published. With the passage of AIPA, on 
November 20, 2000, patent applications that reserved the right to file abroad were published. 
17
 While certain patents may take more than six years to be granted, studies have shown that the 
overwhelming population is granted within few years from grant. For instance, Popp et al (2004) showed 
that 50% of patents takes at most 23 months to be granted. Further, Regibeau and Rockett (2010) found 
a similar average application length for a selected group of patents. 
18https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/electronic-data-products/patent-assignment-dataset      
19
 Disclosure as of yet is not mandatory. However, for legal reasons entities are inclined to disclose such 
transactions. For instance, in patent infringement cases the court needs to have clear view of patent 
ownership. 
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each patent application that took place within a short period of time from application 
date. The usual practice is that once an application is filed, the inventor(s) if employed 
by a firm/organization, assign(s) ownership to her employer usually on the same day or 
within a few weeks/months. Therefore, by capturing the first transaction that has also 
occurred early we are able to capture the owner’s country. We treat the 
firm/organization as applicant only if the assignment has taken place within 12 months 
from the date of application.  
Via this methodology, we collected assignee’s location information for 376,425 
patent applications; approximately 79% of our sample. The rest could be patent 
applications that disclosed a patent owner but much later than twelve months. However, 
in all likelihood these are patent applications that did not have an owner and by default 
they were inventor-owned since they did not transfer ownership to a firm or 
organization.20 
 
4.2. Data Description 
The average propensity of a patent application to be granted a patent is 65.4%. 
This number however masks significant variation across countries and types of 
collaboration. Table 1 displays the average propensity of a patent application to be 
issued a patent by country and further distinguishes by type of collaboration: single 
inventor patent applications, teams where all the inventors are from the same country, 
and teams where at least one inventor is from a different country.21 
As can be seen there is considerable variation across countries both for the 
overall patent grant likelihood and when accounting for the composition of the research 
team. The higher overall likelihood of patent grant belongs to low innovative countries 
such as Latvia, Romania and Lithuania but so does the lowest for countries such as 
Cyprus, Malta and Portugal. However, with such small number of patent applications 
we cannot safely draw any conclusions.  
Turning our attention to the comparison between inventor collaborations, we 
observe that for half of the countries, either solely domestic or international teams 
deliver higher probability of patent grant than single inventors’ patent applications. 
 
20
 Data from other sources show similar percentages to USPTO. Agiakloglou et al. (2015) have found 
that approximately 15% of US patents issued between 1990-2000 belong to inventors. According to 
USPTO data, in 2015, 13% of patents belonged to inventors. 
21
 We should note that the sum of observations exceeds the number of patent applications described early. 
This occurs because we double count patent applications that have inventors from multiple countries. 
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Further, in thirteen out of twenty eight countries, international collaborations deliver 
higher probability of patent grant than domestic collaborations. 
Looking into intra- and inter-EU collaborations, we further compare 
applications with TOP10EU- and LOW18EU-located inventors. Table 2 shows the 
likelihood of patent grant by type of collaboration. Column 1 includes all patent 
applications. Column 2 includes patent applications that have not generated continuing 
applications and they themselves are not continuing applications as well; i.e. the stand-
alone applications. This group of patent applications can provide us with valuable 
insights as they are less likely to be associated with strategic (or increased) prosecution. 
In other words, in case the average patent application differs in the probability of patent 
grant than a stand-alone application, we can infer that at least a part of this difference 
is attributed to increased efforts by the applicant to obtain a patent. Indeed in all cases 
stand-alone applications have lower likelihood to be issued a patent than the average 
patent.  
The highest probabilities of patent grant are observed for collaborations with 
US inventors and collaborations with TOP10EU countries. It is interesting to point that 
TOP10EU countries deliver high probability of patent grant both when inventors are 
from a single country and when inventors are from more than one TOP10EU country. 
Further, inventor collaborations with the US are associated with the highest propensity 
of patent grant. 
Turning our attention to LOW18EU countries, they are overall associated with 
lower likelihood of obtaining a patent regardless of type of collaboration than 
TOP10EU countries. Further, collaborations with a US located inventor deliver the 
highest probability of patent grant than all other types of collaboration. 
 
5. Results 
Table 3 estimates versions of equation (1). Columns 1-4 consider all patent 
applications. In Column 1 only the coefficients of Team and PCT are included (in 
addition to the fixed effects). Starting with PCT, its coefficient is negative; a patent 
application with a PCT priority is 4.2% less likely to be issued a patent. The negative 
coefficient with respect to PCT is robust across all Columns. This result, at first glance 
may seem counterintuitive; applicants that first file to WIPO have more time to draft 
the patent application and in general have more time to plan their patent prosecution 
strategy. On the other hand, patent applications that are filed directly to the USPTO 
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could be applications that the applicants consider valuable and of high quality and 
therefore do not want to waste time by filing at an interim office. This result is also 
corroborated by Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2000) for a sample of patent 
applications at the EPO. 
The coefficient of Team is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
While the magnitude of the coefficient varies across Columns, it is always significant 
at the 1% level indicative of the positive role of teams in securing the grant validating 
Hypothesis 1. 
In Column 2, we include the International dummy. Patent applicants with 
international collaboration are 2.9% more likely to be issued a patent than applications 
without.  This coefficient remains significant across all specifications of Table 3. 
Goertzel et al. (2017) and Alonso-Martínez (2018) argue that international 
collaborations can have positive effects in the quality of innovation outcomes. Our 
results here corroborate the above studies by showing that international collaborations 
increase the likelihood of patent grant. 
In Column 3, we include the USCoinventor dummy. Patent applications with a 
US co-inventor are 2.3% more likely to be issued a patent than applications without. 
However, in Column 4 when we include the USOwner and InventorOwned dummies, 
we observe that the USCoinventor dummy reduces in magnitude. On the other hand the 
USOwner dummy is positive and statistically significant. This result implies that US 
ownership plays an important role in securing the grant validating in part Hypothesis 2 
on the presence of a US entity in the patent application.  
Further, the coefficient of InventorOwned is negative and significant indicating 
that patent applications owned by inventors are less likely to be issued a patent than 
applications owned by non-US firms or organizations. 
 While the above findings provide insights on the average propensity of patent 
grant, they do not inform us on whether certain types of collaborations are associated 
with increased tendency of strategic patent prosecution or to the very least increased 
efforts to obtain a patent. To examine this further, in Columns 5-8, we focus strictly on 
patent applications that are not continuing applications and they themselves did not 
generate continuing patent applications (i.e. stand-alone patent applications). In other 
words, we focus on patent applications which their owners did not use continuation 
features to obtain a patent. 
15 
 
Results are by and large similar in significance as before with one important 
distinction. In Column 8, the USCoinventor dummy is not significant. This implies that 
in applications where no continuations are used, US inventor collaborations are equally 
likely to deliver patent grant as other types of collaborations. However, the presence of 
a US owner is still associated with a higher likelihood of patent grant.  
To examine if the differences are statistically significant between stand-alone 
applications and applications associated with a continuing application, we include all 
applications in Column 9 and include the following variables: Cont that takes the value 
of 1 if application is associated with a continuing application and 0 otherwise and the 
interaction of Cont with all the focal variables (Team, International, USCoinventor, 
USOwner and InventorOwned). Results are intuitive. The coefficient of Cont is positive 
and significant indicating that these applications indeed are more likely to be issued a 
patent consistent with Hypothesis 4. More importantly, the interaction terms of 
Cont_x_USCoinventor and  Cont_x_USOwner are positive and significant implying 
that applications with a US Owner or a US co-inventor are even more likely to be issued 
with the use of continuing applications consistent again with Hypothesis 4. 
In Table A of the Appendix we re-estimate Table 3 via a probit model. Results 
are by and large similar providing robustness on the choice of the estimator. In Table 
B of the Appendix, we re-estimate Table 3 by including the Claims and Claims2. The 
sample reduces to the observations where we have claims information. Most results are 
qualitatively similar.22 The coefficient of Claims is positive and significant across the 
board. However, Claims2 is negative indicating diminishing returns to the positive role 
of the number of claims in the likelihood of grant.  There can be two possible reasons 
for this positive association. First, to the extent that more claims represent larger patent 
scope, such applications on average could be of higher quality and therefore more likely 
to be issued a patent. Second, more claims could potentially wear down the patent 
examiner and therefore more likely to allow the patent to be granted. While the patent 
may be granted with fewer claims, it will nevertheless be patented.23 
Thus far, we have examined collaborations for all patent applications. In the 
next two tables, we decompose by the location of the inventors effectively examining 
 
22
 The only difference is that the USCoinventor dummy in Column 8 is negative and significant. 
However, this does not alter qualitatively our interpretation as the positive role is still primarily driven 
the USOwner dummy. 
23
 For an excellent discussion on USPTO’s resources and the difference between the number of filed and 
issued claims see Frakes and Wasserman (2015). 
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Hypothesis 3. In Table 4, we consider patent applications that disclose at least one 
inventor from a TOP10EU country – we denote these as TOP10EU applications. 
Column 1 includes all patents. As before the coefficient of PCT is negative and 
statistically significant; a result that remains robust across all specifications. The 
coefficient of Team is again positive and significant. This result remains robust even 
when we only consider stand-alone applications in Column 4. 
To focus on the types of collaborations in Column 2 we exclude patent 
applications that were filed by a single inventor and decompose the types of 
international collaborations as in equation (2) excluding the USOwner and 
InventorOwned dummies. The coefficient of WithinTOP10EU shows that patent 
applications with collaboration within the TOP10EU countries are 1.4% more likely to 
be issued a patent than patent applications from TOP10EU countries without such 
international collaboration. Also, collaborations with US inventors are associated with 
higher likelihood of obtaining a patent but collaboration with LOW18EU is associated 
with lower likelihood. The only type of collaboration that is not statistically significant 
is the one with non-EU/non-US inventors. In Column 3, we include the USOwner and 
InventorOwned dummies. Results are similar to Table 3: both the existence of a US 
owner and/or co-inventor increase the likelihood of a grant while inventor owned patent 
applications are less likely to obtain a grant.  
In Columns 4-6 we only consider stand-alone patent applications; the order of 
the Columns is similar to those of 1-3. In Column 5 we observe that none of the inventor 
collaborations is positive and strongly statistically significant. In Column 6, the 
USOwner dummy is, as previously, positive and statistically significant. The coefficient 
of NonEUNonUSCoinventor turns significant but only at the 10% level. These results 
show that when no continuations are used all types of inventor collaborations are 
similarly likely to be issued a patent as within a TOP10EU country’s collaboration. 
However, US presence in the form of an owner still delivers higher likelihood of patent 
grant. Results are corroborated when we include all applications and include the Cont 
dummy and all the relevant interaction terms.  
In Table 5 we consider patent applications that disclose at least one inventor 
from a LOW18EU country – we denote these as LOW18EU patent applications. 
Column 1 considers all such patent applications. The coefficient of PCT is again 
negative and significant across all specifications. The coefficient of Team is again 
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positive and significant both in Column 1 and Column 4 where in the latter we consider 
stand-alone patent applications. 
Column 2 estimates equation (3) by excluding the USOwner and 
InventorOwned dummies. Collaborations with US and non-EU/non-US inventors are 
positively associated with the likelihood of grant.  When we include the USOwner 
dummy in Column 3, the coefficient of USCoinventor remains similar in magnitude 
and significance.  
We should further note that the coefficient of NonEUNonUSCoinventor is 
positive and statistically significant across the both specifications (Columns 2-3). 
In Columns 4-6 we only consider stand-alone patent applications. In Columns 
4-6 no type of collaboration is statistically significant except for the coefficient of 
NonEUNonUSCoinventor in one out of two cases.24 In Column 6, the presence of a US 
owner increases the probability of patent grant. Column 7 includes all applications and 
accounts for which applications are associated with continuations. As previously, the 
coefficient of Cont is positive and significant. Interestingly, there is no statistical 
difference between stand-alone applications and those associated with continuations for 
the cases where a US owner is involved while in the case a US co-inventor is involved 
the latter types of applications are significantly more likely to be issued a patent. 
The above results show that inventor composition and the presence of a US 
owner coupled with increased patent prosecution efforts matter. However, in certain 
aspects, they matter differently for high and low innovative EU countries. The presence 
of a US owner appears to matter more in the case of highly innovative countries while 
US inventor collaborations matter more for the case of the low innovative countries. 
For low innovative countries non-EU/non-US inventor collaborations also appear to 
matter for the likelihood of patent grant. The above results partly validate Hypothesis 
3 with the exception of the role of US ownership for highly innovative countries. In 
both cases however, consistent with Hypothesis 4, we observe that a large part of the 
effects can be attributed to increased efforts of patent prosecution evident by continuing 
patent applications. 
 
 
24
 We pursued this issue further and included a Non-EU/Non-US owner dummy; any positive role by 
Non-EU/Non-US inventor collaborations is then accounted by the Non-EU/Non-US owner dummy both 
for LOW18EU and TOP10EU countries.  This indicates that any positive role Non-EU/Non-US entities 
have on the likelihood of patent grant can be attributed to ownership rather than inventor collaboration. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
 At the forefront of protecting innovations, is the ability of inventors to obtain a 
patent for their inventions. Our setting is all patent applications filed at the USPTO over 
the period 2001-2009 and explicitly focus on EU located inventors. Our first finding is 
that teams are strongly associated with higher probability of obtaining a patent; a result 
consistent with the literature on teams and invention quality. For the average patent 
application, international collaborations can also increase the likelihood of patent grant. 
With respect to TOP10EU countries, we find that collaborations with the US 
are associated positively with patent grant. Further US ownership also plays a positive 
role in obtaining a patent. Partly this US effect can be due to strategic patent prosecution 
as evident by continuations. Nonetheless, US ownership is also significant for the case 
of stand-alone patent applications. 
With respect to LOW18EU countries, inventor collaboration with the US 
increases the likelihood of patent grant. Even after we include the US owner variables, 
US coinventorship stills remains significant. However, when we only consider stand-
alone patent application, the positive role of US co-inventors dissipates. Finally, 
LOW18EU countries are also benefited from collaborations with other non-EU/non-
US pointing to the need for these countries to pursue international collaborations to gain 
experience in pursuing patentable inventions and better patent prosecution. 
With respect to policy our results point towards the importance of the intricacies 
of patent prosecution and the tools that applicants have in their disposal in obtaining a 
patent. Further, they indicate that while inventor collaborations are important and can 
be prolific in obtaining a patent, the location of the owner also matters and in some 
cases may overshadow the role of inventor collaborations.  
 
 
  
19 
 
References 
Agiakloglou, C., K. Drivas, and D. Karamanis. "Individual Inventors and Market 
Potentials: Evidence from US Patents." Science and Public Policy 43, no. 2(2016): 147-
56. 
 
Alonso-Martínez, D. (2018). Social progress and international patent collaboration. 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 134, 169-177. 
 
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J. S. (2008). Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist's 
companion. Princeton university press. 
 
Balasubramanian, N., and J. Sivadasan. "What Happens When Firms Patent? New 
Evidence from U.S. Economic Census Data." Review of Economics and Statistics 93, 
no. 1(2011): 126-146. 
 
Berger R (2005): A Study on the Cost of Patenting, prepared on behalf of the European 
Patent Office. 
 
Bessen, J. (2008). The value of US patents by owner and patent characteristics. 
Research Policy, 37(5), 932-945. 
 
Bessen, J., and M.J. Meurer. 2008. Patent failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and 
Lawyers put Innovators at Risk: Princeton University Press. 
 
Blundell, R., R. Griffith, and J. Van Reenen. "Market share, market value and 
innovation in a panel of British manufacturing firms." Review of Economic Studies 66, 
no. 3(1999): 529-554. 
 
Breitzman, A., Thomas, P., & Cheney, M. (2002). Technological powerhouse or diluted 
competence: techniques for assessing mergers via patent analysis. R&D Management, 
32(1), 1-10. 
 
Chalioti, E., Drivas, K., Kalyvitis, S., & Katsimi, M. (2016). Innovation, Patents and 
Trade: A Firm-level Analysis. 
 
de Rassenfosse, G., Jaffe, A. B., & Webster, E. (2016). Low-quality patents in the eye 
of the beholder: Evidence from multiple examiners (No. w22244). National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
 
de Rassenfosse, G., Raiteri, E., & Bekkers, R. (2017). Discrimination in the patent 
system: evidence from standard-essential patents. 
 
de Rassenfosse, G., Jensen, P. H., Julius, T. M., Palangkaraya, A., & Webster, E. 
(2018). Getting Patents: Does the Quality of Patent Attorney Matter?. Alfons and 
Webster, Elizabeth M., Getting Patents: Does the Quality of Patent Attorney Matter. 
 
Danguy, J., & de la Potterie, B. V. P. (2011). Cost-benefit analysis of the community 
patent. Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, 2(2), 1-43. 
 
20 
 
Economics, E. (2014). Economic Analysis of the Unitary Patent and Unified Patent 
Court. 
 
European Commission (2011) “Impact assessment accompanying document to the 
proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council implementing 
enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of Unitary Patent protection and 
proposal for a Council regulation implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the 
creation of Unitary Patent protection with regard to the applicable translation 
arrangements” 
 
Ezcurra, R., & Pascual, P. (2008). Fiscal decentralization and regional disparities: 
evidence from several European Union countries. Environment and Planning A, 40(5), 
1185-1201. 
 
Frakes, M. D., & Wasserman, M. F. (2015). Does the US Patent and Trademark Office 
Grant Too Many Bad Patents: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment. Stan. L. Rev., 67, 
613. 
 
Frakes, M. D., and M. F. Wasserman. "Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent 
Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-
Level Application Data." Review of Economics and Statistics (2016). 
 
Geppert, K., & Stephan, A. (2008). Regional disparities in the European Union: 
Convergence and agglomeration. Papers in Regional Science, 87(2), 193-217. 
 
Goertzel, B., Goertzel, T., & Goertzel, Z. (2017). The global brain and the emerging 
economy of abundance: Mutualism, open collaboration, exchange networks and the 
automated commons. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 114, 65-73. 
 
Graham, Stuart J.H. and Marco, Alan C. and Miller, Richard, The USPTO Patent 
Examination Research Dataset: A Window on the Process of Patent Examination 
(November 30, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2702637 
 
Griliches, Z. "Market value, R&D, and patents." Economic Letters 7, no. 2(1981): 183-
187. 
 
Guellec, D., and B. van Pottelsberghe. 2000. "Applications, grants and the value of 
patent." Economics Letters 69:109-114. 
 
Harhoff, D., K. Hoisl, B. Reichl, and B. van Pottelsberghe. "Patent Validation at the 
Country Level - The Role of Fees and Translation costs." Research Policy 38(2009): 
1423-1437. 
 
Heller, M.A., and R.S. Eisenberg. 1998. "Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research." Science 280:698-701. 
 
Henkel, J., & Jell, F. (2010). Patent Pending–Why faster isn’t always better. Available 
at SSRN 1738912. 
 
21 
 
Jones, C.I. 2005. "The Shape of Production Functions and the Direction of Technical 
Change." Quarterly Journal of Economics 120:517–549. 
 
Kaitila, V. (2004). Convergence of real GDP per capita in the EU15. How do the 
Accession Countries fit in? (No. 025). 
 
Kuhn, J. M., & Thompson, N. (2017). The Ways We've Been Measuring Patent Scope 
are Wrong: How to Measure and Draw Causal Inferences with Patent Scope. 
 
Lei, Z., & Wright, B. D. (2017). Why weak patents? Testing the examiner ignorance 
hypothesis. Journal of Public Economics, 148, 43-56. 
 
Lemley, M. A., and B. Sampat. "Examiner characteristics and patent office outcomes." 
Review of Economics and Statistics 94, no. 3(2012): 817-827. 
 
Lerner, J. 1994. "The Importance of Patent Scope: An Empirical-Analysis." Rand 
Journal of Economics 25(2):319-333. 
 
Lerner, J. "The Empirical Impact of Intellectual Property Rights on Innovation: Puzzles 
and Clues." American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 99, no. 2(2009): 343-
348. 
 
Mann, R. J., & Sager, T. W. (2007). Patents, venture capital, and software start-ups. 
Research Policy, 36(2), 193-208. 
 
Marco, Alan C., Graham, Stuart J.H., Myers, Amanda F., D'Agostino, Paul A and 
Apple, Kirsten, The USPTO Patent Assignment Dataset: Descriptions and Analysis 
(July 27, 2015). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2636461  
 
Moser, P. "How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-
Century World's Fairs." American Economic Review 95, no. 4(2005): 1214-1236. 
 
Murray, F., and S. Stern. 2007. "Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free 
Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis." 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 63:648-687. 
 
Popp, D., T. Juhl, and D.K.N. Johnson. 2004. "Time in Purgatory: Examining the Grant 
Lag for U.S. Patent Applications." Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy 4(1 (Article 
29)):1-43. 
 
Quillen, C. D., and O. H. Webster. "Continuing patent applications and performance of 
the US Patent Office." Federal Circuit Bar Journal 11, no. 1(2001): 1-21. 
 
Quillen, C. D., O. H. Webster, and R. Eichmann. "Continuing Patent Applications and 
Performance of the US Patent and Trademark Office-Extended." Federal Circuit Bar 
Journal 12, no. 1(2002): 35-55. 
 
Regibeau, P.and K. Rockett. 2010. "Innovation Cycles and Learning at the Patent 
Office: Does the Early Patent Get the Delay?" Journal of Industrial Economics 
58(2):222-246. 
22 
 
 
Sampat, B. N., & Shadlen, K. C. (2017). Secondary pharmaceutical patenting: A global 
perspective. Research Policy, 46(3), 693-707. 
 
Sandner, P. G., and J. Block. "The market value of R&D, patents, and trademarks." 
Research Policy 40, no. 7(2011): 969-985. 
 
Schettino, F., Sterlacchini, A., & Venturini, F. (2013). Inventive productivity and patent 
quality: Evidence from Italian inventors. Journal of Policy Modeling, 35(6), 1043-
1056. 
 
Schuett, F. "Patent quality and incentives at the patent office." Rand Journal of 
Economics 44, no. 2(2013): 313-336. 
 
Scotchmer, S. (2004). Innovation and incentives. MIT press. 
 
Singh, J., and L. Fleming. "Lone Inventors as Sources of Breakthroughs: Myth or 
Reality?" Management Science 56, no. 1(2010): 41-56. 
 
Tseng, C. Y., & James Goo, Y. J. (2005). Intellectual capital and corporate value in an 
emerging economy: empirical study of Taiwanese manufacturers. R&D Management, 
35(2), 187-201. 
 
Van Zeebroeck, N., de la Potterie, B. V. P., & Guellec, D. (2009). Claiming more: the 
increased voluminosity of patent applications and its determinants. Research Policy, 
38(6), 1006-1020. 
 
Webster, E., P. H. Jensen, and A. Palangkaraya. "Patent examination outcomes and the 
national treatment principle." Rand Journal of Economics 45, no. 2(2014): 449-469. 
 
Webster, E., Palangkaraya, A., & Jensen, P. H. (2007). Characteristics of international 
patent application outcomes. Economics Letters, 95(3), 362-368. 
 
Yamauchi, I., & Nagaoka, S. (2015). An economic analysis of deferred examination 
system: Evidence from a policy reform in Japan. International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 39, 19-28.
23 
 
Table 1. Patent grant propensity by country and composition of inventor team. 
  Probability of Patent Grant 
Country Obs Overall Single Inventor 
Whole 
Team 
Within 
Country 
Foreign 
Collaboration 
AT 12,030 68.9% 71.2% 68.8% 67.1% 
BE 15,627 63.1% 63.0% 61.5% 64.4% 
BG 492 71.1% 71.9% 62.9% 76.4% 
CY 110 54.5% 34.5% 62.5% 61.5% 
CZ 1,374 66.1% 64.0% 63.0% 68.9% 
DE 187,412 66.9% 69.4% 66.7% 64.2% 
DK 11,490 61.2% 66.6% 59.3% 59.1% 
EE 210 65.7% 51.9% 68.1% 67.4% 
ES 8,949 59.7% 61.0% 58.0% 61.2% 
FI 16,313 63.5% 65.4% 63.3% 60.5% 
FR 69,252 67.6% 69.9% 67.9% 64.3% 
GB 80,735 61.6% 61.6% 60.4% 63.7% 
GR 927 57.0% 51.2% 57.2% 59.6% 
HR 318 57.9% 71.6% 49.2% 58.9% 
HU 1,632 55.6% 57.4% 55.7% 54.7% 
IE 5,092 59.5% 59.1% 56.4% 62.6% 
IT 32,473 68.4% 69.4% 68.2% 67.0% 
LT 135 78.5% 90.0% 79.1% 76.8% 
LU 985 73.2% 73.6% 72.0% 73.5% 
LV 141 48.9% 46.7% 71.4% 44.8% 
MT 62 54.8% 60.0% 44.4% 57.9% 
NL 32,051 61.6% 66.2% 58.5% 62.4% 
PL 1,206 61.6% 54.7% 54.7% 68.4% 
PT 643 52.9% 50.8% 55.6% 51.5% 
RO 401 74.3% 75.6% 65.8% 76.5% 
SE 24,560 65.5% 68.1% 65.7% 61.2% 
SI 478 58.2% 53.5% 60.4% 58.0% 
SK 317 62.8% 71.7% 62.3% 60.0% 
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Table 2. Average probability of patent grant by type of inventor collaborations. 
Type 
All Patent 
applications 
Stand-alone patent 
applications 
1. All Inventors Within a LOW18EU Country 58.1% 56.8% 
2. All Inventors Within a TOP10EU Country 65.2% 64.7% 
3. All Inventors Within LOW18EU Countries 63.7% 58.9% 
4. All Inventors Within TOP10EU Countries 63.2% 62.1% 
5. LOW18EU-TOP10EU Collaborations 61.2% 60.9% 
6. LOW18EU-US Collaborations 65.4% 61.3% 
7. TOP10EU-US Collaborations 66.3% 64.0% 
8. LOW18EU-NonUS Collaborations 61.9% 61.6% 
9. TOP10EU-NonUS Collaborations 62.6% 61.8% 
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Table 3. The role of collaborations in the overall likelihood of patent grant. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Team 0.0376*** 0.0618*** 0.0472*** 0.0441*** 0.0347*** 0.0486*** 0.0443*** 0.0373*** 0.0297*** 
 (0.00157) (0.00236) (0.00330) (0.00329) (0.00175) (0.00285) (0.00395) (0.00394) (0.00363) 
International  0.0290*** 0.0144*** 0.0155***  0.0161*** 0.0118*** 0.0124*** 0.00967*** 
  (0.00211) (0.00313) (0.00312)  (0.00262) (0.00379) (0.00377) (0.00347) 
USCoinventor   0.0234*** 0.0165***   0.00736 -0.00110 -0.00193 
   (0.00362) (0.00371)   (0.00455) (0.00465) (0.00446) 
USOwner    0.0302***    0.0267*** 0.0243*** 
    (0.00224)    (0.00258) (0.00254) 
InventorOwned    -0.0767***    -0.122*** -0.123*** 
    (0.00175)    (0.00232) (0.00230) 
Cont         0.0704*** 
         (0.00626) 
Cont_x_Team         0.0223*** 
         (0.00573) 
Cont_x_International         0.00450 
         (0.00514) 
Cont_x_USCoinventor         0.0139** 
         (0.00675) 
Cont_x_USOwner         0.0190*** 
         (0.00494) 
Cont_x_InventorOwned         0.0410*** 
         (0.00372) 
PCT -0.0419*** -0.0394*** -0.0385*** -0.0335*** -0.0468*** -0.0458*** -0.0455*** -0.0336*** -0.0311*** 
 (0.00145) (0.00146) (0.00146) (0.00147) (0.00169) (0.00170) (0.00170) (0.00171) (0.00148) 
          
Observations 475,857 475,857 475,857 475,857 359,343 359,343 359,343 359,343 475,857 
R-squared 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.131 0.151 0.151 0.151 0.159 0.139 
3-digit US Class FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Application Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
EU Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if patent application is granted and 0 otherwise. The estimation method is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 
Columns 1-4 consider both stand-alone applications and applications related to continuing applications. Columns 5-8 consider only stand-alone applications. Column 9 includes 
all applications and includes a dummy Cont that takes the value of 1 if application is associated with a continuing application and 0 otherwise. It further includes interaction 
terms of Cont with the team composition variables. Standard errors are clustered at the first three-digit US patent classification.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4. Probability of obtaining a patent. Decompose by type of international collaboration. Consider only applications with a TOP10EU located inventor. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Team 0.0366***   0.0347***    
 (0.00160)   (0.00175)    
WithinTOP10EU  0.0141*** 0.0113**  0.00449 0.000600 0.00406 
  (0.00538) (0.00537)  (0.00688) (0.00687) (0.00584) 
TOP10EU_LOW18EU  -0.113* -0.109*  -0.0562 -0.0535 -0.113** 
  (0.0587) (0.0587)  (0.0722) (0.0713) (0.0566) 
USCoinventor  0.0182*** 0.0154***  0.00827 0.00616 0.000312 
  (0.00522) (0.00529)  (0.00674) (0.00683) (0.00608) 
NonEUNonUSCoinventor  -0.000636 0.00399  0.00718 0.0129* 0.00783 
  (0.00515) (0.00513)  (0.00666) (0.00664) (0.00600) 
USOwner   0.0266***   0.0211*** 0.0200*** 
   (0.00266)   (0.00311) (0.00306) 
InventorOwned   -0.0703***   -0.128*** -0.128*** 
   (0.00217)   (0.00305) (0.00304) 
Cont       0.0904*** 
       (0.00264) 
Cont_x_WithinTOP10EU       0.0147** 
       (0.00704) 
Cont_x_TOP10EU_LOW18EU       -0.00131 
       (0.0155) 
Cont_x_USCoinventor       0.00398 
       (0.00802) 
Cont_x_NonEUNonUSCoinventor       -0.0172** 
       (0.00835) 
Cont_x_USOwner       0.0175*** 
       (0.00570) 
Cont_x_InventorOwned       0.0492*** 
       (0.00454) 
PCT -0.0421*** -0.0422*** -0.0390*** -0.0468*** -0.0501*** -0.0403*** -0.0359*** 
 (0.00147) (0.00173) (0.00174) (0.00169) (0.00203) (0.00204) (0.00174) 
        
Observations 457,471 334,608 334,608 359,343 245,287 245,287 334,608 
R-squared 0.125 0.115 0.119 0.151 0.139 0.147 0.128 
3-digit US Class FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Application Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
EU Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if patent application is granted and 0 otherwise. The estimation method is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Columns 1-3 consider both stand-alone applications 
and applications related to continuing applications. Columns 4-6 consider only stand-alone applications. Column 7 includes all applications and includes a dummy Cont that takes the value of 1 if application is associated 
with a continuing application and 0 otherwise. It further includes interaction terms of Cont with the team composition variables. Standard errors are clustered at the first three-digit US patent classification.  *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5. Probability of obtaining a patent. Decompose by type of international collaboration. Consider only applications with a LOW18EU located inventor. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Team 0.0593***   0.0485***    
 (0.00839)   (0.00956)    
WithinLOW18EU  8.41e-05 -0.000327  0.0180 0.0132 0.0125 
  (0.0170) (0.0170)  (0.0219) (0.0218) (0.0211) 
TOP10EU_LOW18EU  0.0299 0.0286  0.0297 0.0221 0.0267 
  (0.0222) (0.0222)  (0.0255) (0.0255) (0.0229) 
USCoinventor  0.0598*** 0.0572***  0.0289 0.0218 0.0148 
  (0.0154) (0.0157)  (0.0199) (0.0203) (0.0198) 
NonEUNonUSCoinventor  0.0289* 0.0309**  0.0311 0.0358* 0.0375* 
  (0.0156) (0.0157)  (0.0204) (0.0203) (0.0199) 
USOwner   0.0120   0.0246** 0.0171 
   (0.0103)   (0.0125) (0.0120) 
InventorOwned   -0.0554***   -0.0866*** -0.0840*** 
   (0.00897)   (0.0118) (0.0116) 
Cont       0.119*** 
       (0.0139) 
Cont_x_WithinLOW18EU       -0.0585* 
       (0.0337) 
Cont_x_TOP10EU_LOW18EU       -0.0217 
       (0.0196) 
Cont_x_USCoinventor       0.0743** 
       (0.0309) 
Cont_x_NonEUNonUSCoinventor       -0.0228 
       (0.0313) 
Cont_x_USOwner       0.0104 
       (0.0213) 
Cont_x_InventorOwned       0.0103 
       (0.0183) 
PCT -0.0377*** -0.0343*** -0.0330*** -0.0345*** -0.0411*** -0.0316*** -0.0292*** 
 (0.00723) (0.00847) (0.00860) (0.00880) (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.00861) 
        
Observations 23,214 18,276 18,276 16,452 12,497 12,497 18,276 
R-squared 0.154 0.150 0.152 0.187 0.184 0.189 0.164 
3-digit US Class FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Application Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
EU Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if patent application is granted and 0 otherwise. The estimation method is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Columns 1-3 consider both stand-alone applications 
and applications related to continuing applications. Columns 4-6 consider only stand-alone applications. Column 7 includes all applications and includes a dummy Cont that takes the value of 1 if application is associated 
with a continuing application and 0 otherwise. It further includes interaction terms of Cont with the team composition variables. Standard errors are clustered at the first three-digit US patent classification.  *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A. Re-estimate Table 3 via probit. Report Marginal Effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if patent application is granted and 0 otherwise. The estimation method is Probit. Columns 1-4 consider both 
stand-alone applications and applications related to continuing applications. Columns 5-8 consider only stand-alone applications. Column 9 includes all applications and 
includes a dummy Cont that takes the value of 1 if application is associated with a continuing application and 0 otherwise. It further includes interaction terms of Cont with the 
team composition variables. Standard errors are clustered at the first three-digit US patent classification.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Team 0.0406*** 0.0668*** 0.0509*** 0.0477*** 0.0396*** 0.0558*** 0.0504*** 0.0427*** 0.0328*** 
 (0.00177) (0.00265) (0.00358) (0.00358) (0.00208) (0.00333) (0.00450) (0.00450) (0.00395) 
International  0.0305*** 0.0150*** 0.0167***  0.0183*** 0.0131*** 0.0145*** 0.0113*** 
  (0.00223) (0.00325) (0.00325)  (0.00293) (0.00417) (0.00418) (0.00364) 
USCoInventor   0.0246*** 0.0174***   0.00893* -0.000491 -0.00181 
   (0.00370) (0.00383)   (0.00502) (0.00523) (0.00476) 
USOwner    0.0338***    0.0318*** 0.0271*** 
    (0.00243)    (0.00299) (0.00278) 
InventorOwned    -0.0858***    -0.143*** -0.135*** 
    (0.00191)    (0.00271) (0.00255) 
Cont         0.0711*** 
         (0.00636) 
Cont_x_Team         0.0229*** 
         (0.00604) 
Cont_x_International         0.00333 
         (0.00541) 
Cont_x_USCoinventor         0.0152** 
         (0.00709) 
Cont_x_USOwner         0.0259*** 
         (0.00562) 
Cont_x_InventorOwned         0.0370*** 
         (0.00375) 
PCT -0.0422*** -0.0395*** -0.0385*** -0.0325*** -0.0490*** -0.0478*** -0.0475*** -0.0325*** -0.0295*** 
 (0.00148) (0.00149) (0.00150) (0.00152) (0.00180) (0.00181) (0.00181) (0.00184) (0.00153) 
          
Observations 475,479 475,479 475,479 475,479 341,507 341,507 341,507 341,507 475,479 
3-digit US Class FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Application Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
EU Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table B. Re-estimate Table 3 – Take into account Claims. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Team 0.0398*** 0.0623*** 0.0497*** 0.0483*** 0.0361*** 0.0473*** 0.0470*** 0.0433*** 0.0373*** 
 (0.00177) (0.00261) (0.00358) (0.00358) (0.00200) (0.00320) (0.00434) (0.00434) (0.00399) 
International  0.0268*** 0.0142*** 0.0141***  0.0130*** 0.0126*** 0.0127*** 0.00922** 
  (0.00229) (0.00335) (0.00335)  (0.00288) (0.00412) (0.00412) (0.00376) 
USCoinventor   0.0204*** 0.0103***   0.000641 -0.00940* -0.0106** 
   (0.00390) (0.00400)   (0.00499) (0.00512) (0.00490) 
USOwner    0.0333***    0.0285*** 0.0253*** 
    (0.00250)    (0.00293) (0.00287) 
InventorOwned    -0.0232***    -0.0584*** -0.0604*** 
    (0.00193)    (0.00268) (0.00267) 
Cont         0.0936*** 
         (0.00668) 
Cont_x_Team         0.00851 
         (0.00612) 
Cont_x_International         0.00246 
         (0.00541) 
Cont_x_USCoinventor         0.0230*** 
         (0.00719) 
Cont_x_USOwner         0.0150*** 
         (0.00535) 
Cont_x_ InventorOwned         0.00684* 
         (0.00408) 
Claims (Coeff. Mult. By 104) 6.763*** 6.363*** 6.235*** 5.835*** 2.274*** 2.113*** 2.110*** 1.872*** 3.907*** 
 (0.595) (0.582) (0.579) (0.563) (0.540) (0.536) (0.537) (0.528) (0.478) 
Claims2 (Coeff. Mult. By 104) -0.000943*** -0.000890*** -0.000872*** -0.000818*** -0.000300*** -0.000280*** -0.000279*** -0.000247*** -0.000530*** 
 (0.000114) (0.000110) (0.000109) (0.000105) (8.04e-05) (7.94e-05) (7.94e-05) (7.76e-05) (8.01e-05) 
PCT -0.0397*** -0.0375*** -0.0367*** -0.0332*** -0.0461*** -0.0453*** -0.0453*** -0.0398*** -0.0364*** 
 (0.00154) (0.00155) (0.00155) (0.00157) (0.00183) (0.00184) (0.00184) (0.00187) (0.00158) 
          
Observations 416,876 416,876 416,876 416,876 309,249 309,249 309,249 309,249 416,876 
R-squared 0.098 0.099 0.099 0.100 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.119 0.108 
3-digit US Class FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Application Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
EU Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if patent application is granted and 0 otherwise. The coefficients of Claims and Claims2 are multiplied by 104 for scaling. The estimation method is Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS). Columns 1-4 consider both stand-alone applications and applications related to continuing applications. Columns 5-8 consider only stand-alone applications. Column 9 includes all applications and 
includes a dummy Cont that takes the value of 1 if application is associated with a continuing application and 0 otherwise. It further includes interaction terms of Cont with the team composition variables. Standard errors 
are clustered at the first three-digit US patent classification.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
